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T A B L E O F A U T H O R I T I E S 
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Utah Code Annotated Sec 35-1-77 (1)(a) 
RULES 
Utah Industrial Commission Procedural rule R490-1-9. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE(S)/RULE(S) 
Utah Industrial Commission Procedural rule R490-1-9. 
SUMMARY OF REPLY 
Of the points that Appellee claims were not preserved on 
appeal, the first is a point of law and has no need of preservation 
for appeal and the second was practically the only issue dealt with 
by the Industrial Commission. 
The rules command the use of a medical panel in cases of 
conflicting medical reports of physical impairment. There is no 
dispute that such is the case here. Therefore, the case should have 
been sent to a medical panel. 
The review conducted by the Industrial Commission was not a 
review based on a "preponderance of the evidence standard". The 
Commission itself uses the language of "substantial evidence". Such 
a review is invalid and improper. The Industrial Commission is in 
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need of guidance from this Court on the proper method of review. 
REPLY ARGUMENT 
The Appellee [hereinafter] Liberty Mutual has replied to the 
Appellant's [hereinafter Mr. Ashcroft] brief with five points: 
1. Points 1 and 2 of Mr. Ashcroft's brief were not preserved for 
appeal. 
2. A medical panel was unnecessary because Mr.Ashcroft had no 
competent medical evidence to support his claim. 
3. The Industrial Commission did use the correct standard in its 
review of the case. 
4. There is substantial evidence to support the findings of the 
Industrial Commission. 
5. Mr. Ashcroft failed to "marshall the evidence" in that he did 
not list the medical evidence adverse to his case. 
POINT I 
THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW IS A POINT OF LAW 
NOT AN ISSUE TO BE PRESERVED FOR REVIEW 
Liberty Mutual seems to be confused over the meaning of point 
1 
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I of the Mr. Ashcroft's brief. The point reads: 
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
This point is not an issue to be decided but is a point of law 
which is supported by several cases. While it may be true that this 
argument was not used at the Commission level, there is no rule or 
law that would prevent the utilization of these cases and 
principles at a later date in an appellate proceeding. 
Point 2 of Mr. Ashcroftfs brief reads: 
THE CONTINUING MEDICAL PROBLEMS CLEARLY AROSE OUT OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS AND NOT OUT OF SUBSEQUENT 
"EPISODES". 
This is simply a statement that the Commission was incorrect 
in its medical factual conclusions. To argue that this issue was 
not present in the appeal to the Commission is amazing. The 
Commission delineated the issues that it was dealing with in its 
denial of motion for review: 
1. Rejection of the ALJ of two permanent partial 
disability ratings in favor of a two year old rating done 
by the "Liberty Mutual account manager." 
2. The failure of the ALJ to order that a medical panel be 
convened to consider among other things the question of 
maximum medical improvement. 
3. The ALJ did not consider that the treating doctors were in 
the diagnostic stages of the case, and the doctors had not 
decided on a course of treatment. 
4. The ALJ lost or ignored the chiropractor1 s results that the 
applicant was improving with chiropractic treatment. 
5. This case contains objective evidence of several 
radiographically verified disc injuries, and surgery was a 
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clear possibility but for the complication of the AIDS. 
See DENIAL OF MOTION FOR REVIEW page 1. 
Four of these five arguments were designed to convince the 
Commission that their findings of fact were incorrect. Specifically 
if the Commission had agreed with Mr. Ashcroft that there was 
evidence of disc injury 
POINT II 
THE RULE REQUIRES CONTROVERSIES OF THIS TYPE TO BE SUBMITTED 
TO A MEDICAL REVIEW BOARD 
Liberty Mutual claims that the rating of Doctors Sanders and 
McNaught "do not remotely qualify as medically and empirically 
substantiated impairment ratings". Since these ratings don't 
qualify, Liberty Mutual claims that the judge was justified in not 
submitting these ratings to a medical panel. This is simply not the 
rule. This decision is not in the hands of the administrative 
judge. 
The rule is quite specific: 
A panel will be utilized by the administrative law judge 
where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. 
Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by 
conflicting medical reports. Significant medical issues are 
involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of physical impairment 
which vary more than 5% of the whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary 
total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more 
than $2,000. * 
See Utah Industrial Commission Procedural rule R490-1-9. 
There is no leeway given to the judge as to whether or not he 
4 
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believes the medical report or whether he believes the level of 
impairment is justified by the facts. The judge is not a doctor. 
The rules clearly states that such a controversy over levels of 
impairment are to be settled by doctors on a medical panel. 
Liberty Mutual contends that the statute granting the use of 
a medical panel is permissive and indeed it is: 
"... the Commission may refer the medical aspects of the 
case to a medical panel appointed by the commission11 
See U.C.A. Sec 35-1-77 (1)(a) 
While the grant to the commission itself is permissive the 
rules promulgated by the commission to its administrative law 
judges is not permissive: v 
"A panel will be utilized by the administrative law judge 
where:" 
See Utah Industrial Commission Procedural rule R490-1-9. The 
administrative law judge has no leeway even if the Commission 
itself did have leeway in the promulgation of the rule. Even if 
there were no statutory grant at all in the use of medical the 
Commission could make it mandatory for their judges to use such 
panels. 
If the rule is considered permissive for the judges then the 
rule simply has no meaning at all. Judges may decide to use the 
medical panel or not under whatever circumstances they please. 
Obviously, there would be no uniformity and predictability to such 
a system. 
In actual practice this rule serves a very important purpose. 
5 
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Insurance companies are aware of which doctors will give them the 
ratings that they want. Those doctors find considerable business 
with the insurance companies and have a personal interest in 
assuring continued employment. One way to counteract such personal 
interest is to create a panel that will review conflicting ratings. 
The Industrial Commission wisely decided to make such panels 
mandatory under certain conditions. 
Liberty Mutual also contends that a medical panel is not 
necessary because the rules which control the medical panel are 
"guidelines" and therefore they can be followed by the judges and 
the commission when they are so inclined and that they may decline 
to follow these "guidelines" when contrarily inclined. This 
conclusion appears to be based on the fact that the heading of Rule 
R490-1-9 reads "Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel". 
There are three reasons why such a conclusion is inaccurate. 
The first is that the heading of a rule is not determinative of its 
content. The body of the rule itself is the explanation of the 
meaning of the heading. A Subchapter S Corporation gains its 
meaning not from its heading but from the body of the information 
which defines such a corporation. Hence the "guidelines" explained 
in the rule are made permissive or mandatory based on the rule 
which follows. The guideline for submission of the case to a 
medical panel based on certain criteria is made mandatory if the 
conditions of the rule are met. It is undisputed that these 
conditions are met in this case. Therefore the submission of the 
case to a medical panel is mandatory. 
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Secondly, the established rule of statutory interpretation is 
that the specific controls over the general. In this case even if 
there were a general grant of permissiveness in the heading, there 
is a specific mandatory command in the body of the rule. Since the 
specific controls over the general, the mandatory command is the 
controlling interpretation. 
Finally, the word guideline does not necessarily imply 
permissiveness. My thesaurus states that synonyms for guideline 
are: direction, instruction, regulation, rule or stricture. None 
of these words, used in a regulatory sense, imply permissiveness. 
The mere fact that word "guideline" is used in the heading of 
the Rules does not change the clear meaning of the rule. A medical 
panel "will" be used when a specific set of circumstances is met. 
It is uncontested that these circumstances were met. A panel was 
not used. Herein, we have clear error. 
POINT III 
THE REVIEW DONE BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION MUST BE CORRECT 
IN FACT AND IN FORM 
Petitioner acknowledges the fact that the Commissioners do not 
necessarily have legal training and so may be inexpert in their use 
of legal language. But, the commission executes a judicial function 
which is of critical importance to many injured workers. The 
standard of review which the commission uses is critical with 
respect to the adjudication of cases at the administrative judge 
level. We are certain that this Court recognizes that the 
7 
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Commission is reviewing the actions of its own administrative 
judges. It is imperative that this review not give way to 
bureaucratic efficiency, but that this review is calculated to 
insure that substantial justice is done in these cases. Therefore, 
we would ask this Court to instruct the Commission that the 
appropriate standard of review must applied at the Commission level 
in form and in fact. In applying the "preponderance of the evidence 
rule" the Commission must explore the evidence which is available 
on both sides of the issue and explain why one body of evidence is 
superior to the other. 
If such instruction is not given to the Commission we can 
anticipate, at the least, continued loose language from the 
Commission in their decisions. What is more likely is that the 
Commission will simply use the rule which they have declared that 
they are using, which is a "substantial evidence" standard. Such 
a rule would allow the Commission to seek out any evidence that 
would support its judges and therefore reinforce the power of the 
Commission's judges and ease its own administrative burdens. 
If the Commission uses the language of substantial evidence, 
it must be assumed that the Commission is using the substantial 
evidence review. If the Commission is allowed to use the language 
of substantial evidence then we are more likely to see appeals of 
such rulings with the burden falling on this court to review each 
ruling to decide whether the Commission actually meant what they 
said. 
1 
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POINT IV 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT MEET THE 
STANDARD OF A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
Again Liberty Mutual has missed the point and shares the 
confusion of the Industrial Commission. The Industrial Commission's 
review was based on a substantial evidence standard. As we have 
shown, the proper review standard is a "preponderance of the 
evidence". To recite the case against Mr. Ashcroft without 
specifically weighing all of the evidence for Mr. Ashcroft is an 
invalid analysis. 
A "preponderance of the evidence" review requires that the 
both sides of the argument be weighed and considered. This was not 
done by the Industrial Commission in their review. To simply state 
that there is evidence to support the decision is exactly the error 
created by the Industrial Commission initially. 
POINT V 
MR. ASHCROFT HAS MARSHALLED THE EVIDENCE EQUALLY AS WELL 
AS EITHER LIBERTY MUTUAL OR THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
It is somewhat poetic that Liberty Mutual should now accuse 
Mr. Ashcroft of the same sin of which the Industrial Commission is 
guilty. While Liberty Mutual finds no problem with a marshalling 
of the evidence satisfying a simple "substantial evidence" standard 
by either the Industrial Commission or itself, they take issue with 
Mr. Ashcroft's emphasis on his own best evidence. While it could 
be argued, the question raised is basically one of fact to be 
decided by a perusal of the evidence available in the record and 
on the briefs. 
9 
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The appellant is content to leave the question to this court 
to decide if the record and briefs provide sufficient information 
for a determination of the issue. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The decision of the Industrial Commission should be overturned 
and sent back with intructions that a medical panel be used and 
that reviews by the Industrial Commmissions of lower judges must 
be done based on a "preponderance of the evidence" standard with 
appropriate language and weighing of the evidence from both sides. 
Sam Primavera, ESQ. 
Attorney for Appellant 
10 
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